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For the first time in history, the majority of the largest international
initial public offerings ("IPOs") are taking place in London rather than
New York. New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New York
Senator Charles Schumer have blamed this shift primarily on America's
over-regulation of capital markets.1 While the dominant discourse had
assumed an international convergence on the American model of
corporate and securities law,2 more recently American commentators
and regulators are starting to ask what they can learn from other
jurisdictions.
In Canada, where securities regulation is a provincial matter, the
entire Canadian securities system has been shifting away from the
historical American template to a UK-style principles-based approach.
3
At a general level, the UK approach places emphasis on normative
guidelines rather than detailed rules. However, Canadian firms have
also been directly impacted by American regulation. This article offers
a beginning point for discussion by considering the issues from a
Canadian perspective. Specifically, it examines the effect of the U.S.
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. Val Culp provided excellent research
assistance. I am grateful to Aaron Dhir and Steven Ramirez for helpful comments. Research for
this article is current to April 20, 2007.
1. MICHAEL BLOOMBERG & CHARLES SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US'
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP ii (January 2007), available at http://www.senate
.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/special-reports/2007/NY -REPORT%20_FINAL.pdf.
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
3. Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation,
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2008); see also CRAWFORD PANEL ON A SINGLE CANADIAN
SECURITIES REGULATOR, BLUEPRINT FOR A CANADIAN SECURITIES COMMISSION: FINAL PAPER
12 (2006), available at http://www.crawfordpanel.ca/Crawford-Panel-final-paper.pdf
(advocating as much principles-based regulation as possible). See generally TASK FORCE TO
MODERNIZE SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA, CANADA STEPS UP (2006), available at
http://www.tfmsl.ca/ (examining Canadian securities regulation).
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implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") of 2002 on
Canadian issuers. 4 Part II offers an analysis of the net economic impact
of SOX, specifically focusing on delisting activity and stock
performance.5 After concluding that the net economic impact of SOX
has been negative, this Article critically compares and evaluates the
Canadian response to consider what lessons may be drawn in the wake
of current American initiatives to roll back SOX.6 Part II traces the
response to SOX in Canada with reference to the following legislation:
Multilateral Instruments 52-109 (MI 52-109)7 and 52-110 (MI 52-
110),8 and National Instruments 52-108, 58-101, and 58-201. Part IV
concludes by considering both the upside and the particular challenges
facing the Canadian response to SOX from a regulatory and risk
management standpoint.
9
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOX ON CROSS LISTED COMPANIES
In considering the impact of SOX on Canadian companies and on
similar, but different, Canadian legislative reforms, it is essential to first
discuss SOX's net effect on the capital markets generally. A number of
recent studies explored SOX's economic impact and attempted to weigh
the potential benefits of stricter corporate governance regulation against
the cost of implementing and maintaining these new standards.
Academics expected SOX to help restore confidence in the U.S.
corporate governance system, but it was not clear if the net effect would
be positive or negative.' 0 This is of particular concern for smaller
companies because the additional costs of complying with SOX are
fixed rather than variable. It has been hypothesized that its effects on
smaller companies will be more negative in comparison to larger
4. See infra Part II (discussing how Canada implemented corporate governance regulation to
compete with America); see also 15 U.S.C.A. §7245 (West 2002).
5. See infra Part II (concluding that there is a negative relationship between SOX and cross-
listed company market values).
6. See infra Part III (arguing that Canada balanced the need to harmonize with SOX and keep
a principles-based model of governance with the American rules-based model).
7. See infra Part III (discussing Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of Disclosure in
Issuers' Annual and Interim Filings). A Multilateral Instrument is one that has been adopted by a
number of provinces but not all provinces. In contrast, a National Instrument is one that has been
adopted by all provinces.
8. See infra Part HI (discussing Multilateral Instrument 52-110).
9. See infra Part IV (concluding that there appears to be no requirement to implement new
control procedures in Canada but that most managers will be motivated by the certification
process to implement justifiable processes).
10. See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:
What's Right and What's Wrong? 15:3 BANK OF AM. J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 17 (2003).
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companies. I I
SOX has an extraterritorial application in that it applies to all publicly
traded companies on U.S. stock exchanges, notwithstanding their status
as cross-listed foreign issuers. Several studies have utilized cross-listed
companies to analyze the net effect of SOX on the capital markets.
12
The underlying theory is that foreign issuers list on U.S. exchanges
primarily to increase their share value and reduce their cost of capital.
These benefits are theoretically created due to the greater pool of capital
supply in the United States, higher share liquidity in U.S. markets, and
greater analyst coverage. 13  An additional rationale for the decreased
cost of capital in listing on U.S. exchanges is the value imputed to the
firm for adopting the higher shareholder protections and corporate
governance standards required in the U.S. market.14 This latter factor
has been described as the "bonding effect" but is difficult to explicitly
measure since it is imbedded within many other factors that explain
foreign listings in the United States.
15
The introduction of SOX provided an opportunity for several scholars
to evaluate the efficacy of the bonding hypothesis and to measure the
market reaction to the new legislative scheme. 16  These studies
indirectly evaluate the market's anticipation of the effect of SOX on
Canadian cross-listed firms. They are consistent in finding that the
capital markets generally perceived SOX as imposing higher costs than
benefits to foreign issuers from countries, like Canada, which already
boast strict corporate governance, accounting, and securities regulation
regimes. 17  Companies that originate in jurisdictions with weaker
11. Id.; CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES CANADA LTD., THE COST AND BENEFITS OF
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND AUDITOR ATTESTATION ON INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER
FINANCIAL REPORTING 13 (2004), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/
Part5/rule_20050204_52-11 _costandbenefits.pdf [hereinafter CRA].
12. Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in
the US, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195, 195 (2007); Geoffrey Peter Smith, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Foreign
Issuer: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis 1 (Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.terry.uga.edu/
finance/research/seminars/papers/smith2.pdf; Philip G. Berger, Feng Li & M.H. Franco Wong,
The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Cross-listed Companies 2 (Jan. 8, 2005), http://w4.stern.nyu
.edu/accounting/docs/speaker-papers/spring2005/Wong-SOX andADRs_010805_updated.pdf.
13. Smith, supra note 12, at 1.
14. Id. For example, before U.S. firms can go private, they must file with the SEC and allow
the SEC to determine whether the proposed change would be fair to minority shareholders. Id.
15. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in
Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 647 (1999) (explaining the
law, desire for liquidity, and foreign listings in the United States).
16. Smith, supra note 12, at l; Berger, Li & Wong, supra note 12, at 2; Litvak, supra note 12,
at 195.
17. Smith, supra note 12, at 1; Berger, Li & Wong, supra note 12, at 2; Litvak, supra note 12,
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regimes are expected to accrue greater benefits from the new rules,
presumably because shareholders feel that risk of agency problems and
inaccurate reporting is significantly reduced when foreign corporations
opt into the U.S. regime. The general conclusion of these studies is that
the negative relationship between SOX and cross-listed company
market value is attributable to the fact that the additional cost of U.S.
compliance outweighs the marginal bonding benefit relative to the
existing regulatory system. The following section will explore the
results of these studies.
A. Delisting Activity Post-SOX Announcements
In a 2005 study, Geoffrey Smith utilized the implementation of SOX
as an opportunity to evaluate the bonding hypothesis. 18 He analyzed the
stock performance of cross-listed firms in the capital market response to
news announcements of SOX. 19  Smith also analyzed delisting
behaviors of non-U.S. firms in response to SOX.20 The primary
objective of the study was to analyze the relationship between the
strength of accounting standards and shareholder protection laws in the
foreign country and the capital market response to news announcements
of SOX's applicability to foreign issuers (i.e., the market expectation of
the net benefit or cost of SOX on foreign issuers).21 The study also
compared the delisting activities of foreign issuers before and after the
implementation of SOX to test the hypothesis that firms (smaller firms
in particular) would delist to avoid the higher costs of the regulatory
structure.
22
The level of accounting standards and shareholder protection laws for
the Smith study was based upon an earlier study by Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny.
23
Their study posits that strong shareholder protection laws are
demonstrated through legislation that ensures minority shareholders are
not unfairly subjugated to the rule of a controlling shareholder.24 More
specifically, the La Porta et al. study identified the following
at 195.
18. Smith, supra note 12, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. (finding the bonding hypothesis largely true for firms with mid-level accouting
standards and shareholder protections).
21. Id. (finding no increase in the overall listing activity of such firms).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 23.
24. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1127-28 (1998)
[hereinafter Law and Finance].
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characteristics as beneficial for minority shareholders: 1:1 share of
voting rights, facilitation of minority shareholder voting (e.g., via
mailing proxy rather than in person), maintenance of liquidity of voting
shares (e.g., no requirement to deposit securities prior to voting),
mechanisms for proportional representation on the board of directors
(such as cumulative voting), oppression and derivative remedies, pre-
emptive purchase rights, ability to call extraordinary shareholders'
meetings without a high percentage of ownership, and mandatory
dividends. 25 Similarly, the La Porta et al. study identified ninety items
in financial statements that may be legally required to be included in
financial statements. 26 In both accounting standards and shareholder
protection laws, Canada was ranked very highly.
27
The Smith study showed that firms headquartered in countries with
already high-level accounting standards and shareholder protection laws
reacted unfavorably to new events leading up to SOX's eventual
enactment while firms from countries with only mid-level accounting
standards and shareholder protection laws reacted favorably to the same
events. 28 The study thus demonstrated that the bonding hypothesis is
true for firms from poorly regulated countries where SOX creates
positive marginal share value by decreasing market risk, through
shareholder protection and accounting standards, by more than the cost
of implementation. 29  By contrast, an avoiding hypothesis could be
drawn from the negative impact to firms from highly regulated
countries.
Notably, the Smith study did not find a general increase in delisting
activities after July 25, 2002.30 However, the study found a relationship
between the size of the firms and the decision to delist, with larger firms
more likely to delist.31  This result is contrary both to the general
academic expectation, and to an Ontario Securities Commission
("OSC") cost-benefit analysis that suggested that small firms would be
disproportionately affected by the fixed costs of SOX implementations
and thus would be more likely to delist.
32
It is significant that the Smith findings with respect to delisting
25. Id. at 1126-28.
26. Id. at 1125.
27. Id. at 1130, 1142.
28. Smith, supra note 12, at 27.
29. See id. (finding that SOX's effect was positive in poorly regulated countries).
30. Id. at 40.
31. Id. at 16-17 (basing the prediction on Holmstrom and Kaplan's conclusion that small
firms will have a harder time accommodating SOX's expenditures).
32. Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 10, at 17; CRA, supra note 11, at 34.
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activity contrast with the findings of similar studies that did not focus
on foreign issuers. In a 2006 study, Christian Leuz, Alexander J.
Triantis, and Tracy Yue Wang found both an increase in "going dark"
transactions, where firms delist but continue to trade on the over-the-
counter markets, and a higher proportion of small firm delistings after
the implementation of SOX for U.S. companies. 33 In another study,
Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes, and Xue Wang also found an increase in
the frequency of going private decisions and that a greater proportion of
these transactions related to small firms.34  Similarly, Ehud Kamar,
Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Eric Talley found an increase in the
proportion of small firms being acquired in going private transactions
concentrated after the announcement of SOX. 35 A possible explanation
for this discrepancy for foreign issuers is that "going dark" is a more
onerous task for a cross-listed firm because Rule 12g3-2, which applies
to the deregistration of foreign companies' securities, looks to beneficial
owners, counting the number of separate accounts for which brokers,
dealers, or banks hold the securities whereas Rule 12g5-1, applicable to
domestic issuers, only examines legal ownership.
36
B. Performance of Stock Post-SOX Announcements
In addition to tracing delisting activity of firms' post-SOX
announcements to test the bonding hypothesis, other studies have
evaluated stock performance following SOX announcements. In 2005,
Philip G. Berger, Feng Li, and M. H. Franco Wong reported on a study
examining the impact of SOX on cross-listed firms to test whether an
exogenous improvement in investor protection affects shareholder
wealth and the firm's monitoring and disclosure environment. 37 In line
with the earlier studies testing the bonding hypothesis, Berger et al.
concluded that for the average foreign issuer, the incremental bonding
benefit provided by SOX was exceeded by SOX's incremental
33. Christian Leuz, Alexander J. Triantis & Tracy Yue Wang, Why do Firms go Dark? Causes
and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations 16-17 (Robert H. Smith Sch.
Research Paper No. 06-045, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=592421.
34. Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-
Private Decisions 1, 3 (May 6, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=546626.
35. Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric L. Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis 3 (U.S.C. Law Legal Studies Paper No.
06-10), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769; see also Andrds Marosi & Nadia Massoud,
Why Do Firms Go Dark? (Univ. of Alberta, Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=570421 (explaining that firms are exploiting a loophole which allows
them to deregister).
36. Kamar, Karaca-Mandic & Talley, supra note 35, at 38.
37. Berger, Li & Wong, supra note 12, at 2.
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compliance costs.38 However, the Berger et al. study also evaluated the
relationship between the strength of private and public enforcement of
investor protection of the firms' home country and the performance of
the stock after SOX announcements, demonstrating an impact on stock
performance where private investor protection is weak.
39
For the Berger et al. study, the strength of private and public
enforcement of investor protections was based upon a study by La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer.40 That study found that private
enforcement mechanisms reduce the cost of private litigation by
providing specific duties and establishing the standard of care required
by market participants. 41 More specifically, the La Porta et al. study
evaluated the requirements in securities laws for (1) the delivery of a
prospectus to investors prior to the sale of securities; (2) the disclosure
of insiders' compensation, ownership by large shareholders, inside
ownership, contracts outside the normal course of business, and
transactions with related parties and all material information necessary
to evaluate the value of the offered securities; and (3) the liability
regime (i.e., standard tort negligence, gross negligence, strict liability
with reliance or causality, and strict liability without reliance or
causality).42 Public enforcement mechanisms were evaluated based on
characteristics of the supervisory body.43 These characteristics include
the independence of the supervisory body from the executive body
(political influence), the investigative powers of the supervisory body
(the ability to command production of information), and the ability to
impose non-criminal and criminal sanctions upon securities market
actors for violations.
44
The La Porta et al. study concluded that strong private enforcement
mechanisms were correlated with higher capital market growth whereas
public enforcement mechanisms had a much weaker relationship. 45 In
the La Porta et al. study, Canada ranked very highly for both public and
38. /d.at2l.
39. Id. at 23.
40. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What
Works in Securities Laws? 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) (examining the effect of securities law on stock
market development in forty-nine countries).
41. Id. at 28 (concluding that the benefit of common law in the area of stock market
development is that it promotes market discipline and private litigation).
42. Id. at 10-11.
43. Id. at I 1-12.
44. Id. at 12 (also evaluating the basic attributes of the supervisor and whether the supervisor
should have the power to regulate securities markets).
45. Id. at 27-28 (explaining that several aspects of public enforcement made no difference).
2008]
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private enforcement.
46
Using the La Porta et al. study as a benchmark, the Berger et al. study
concluded that there was a strong negative relationship between the
strength of private enforcement investor protection of a foreign country
and the performance of the stock after an announcement of SOX
applicability to foreign issuers.47  The study found no relationship
between the strength of public enforcement mechanisms and the
performance of the stock value, which is consistent with the conclusion
of La Porta et al. 48  The analysis also showed no correlation of
performance to the market value of the firms, which is once again
inconsistent with the general expectation detailed above.
In a recent study, Kate Litvak also performed an analysis of cross-
listed firms relative to non-cross listed firms from the same country to
isolate the effects of SOX while controlling for broader economic and
political trends within those countries. 49 Consistent with the Berger et
al. study, her research found that the market value of cross-listed
companies subject to SOX reacted strongly and negatively to the news
of the applicability of SOX. 50 When looking to country-level effects of
SOX, Litvak's results are consistent with the view that companies
operating in a high-level disclosure regime suffered larger net costs than
companies from countries with lower-quality disclosure. 51 Negative
reactions were strongest in countries likely to be relatively well
governed (most of Europe and Canada).
52
Taken together, both the Berger and Litvak studies are consistent in
concluding that SOX had a net negative impact upon foreign cross-
listed firms.53  The incremental bonding benefits appear to be
outweighed by the increased cost of corporate governance. 54 These
negative impacts are especially acute for firms that are already subject
to a high level of investor protection regimes in their home country.
55
46. Id. at 15.
47. Berger, Li & Wong, supra note 12, at 23.
48. Id.
49. Litvak, supra note 12, at 213-15, 226.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 226.
52. Id. at 215.
53. Berger, Li & Wong, supra note 12, at 29; Litvak, supra note 12, at 213-15, 226.
54. Berger, Li & Wong, supra note 12, at 29-30; Litvak, supra note 12, at 213-15, 226.
55. Berger, Li & Wong, supra note 12, at 29; Litvak, supra note 12, at 213-15, 226.
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III. REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SOX IN CANADA
The United States responded to the high-profile corporate scandals of
Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing, and others with SOX. Not immune
to failures in corporate governance, Canada witnessed similar financial
scandals such as Nortel, Livent, and Cinar Corporation. 56  The
combination of internal failures and U.S. pressure to implement reforms
resulted in significant debate and eventual action on the part of
Canadian securities regulators to implement corporate governance
regulations. The overwhelming influence of U.S. markets on
international capital markets has forced all other markets to evaluate
their own corporate governance legislation to remain competitive.
57
Canada was uniquely concerned about the potential repercussions of
failing to match U.S. regulations because of the existence of the Multi-
Jurisdiction Disclosure System ("MJDS") that allows Canadian issuers,
already subjected to Canadian securities regulations, to list in the U.S.
markets with reduced regulatory costs. 58 If Canada was not seen to be
providing a similar level of disclosure scrutiny as the United States, it
was possible that MJDS would be imperiled. Canadian regulators were
thus forced to weigh the costs and benefits of harmonizing their
securities laws with SOX and assess the efficacy of the traditional
principles-based model of corporate governance against the rules-based
U.S. model.59
A. Canadian Regulatory Response: The Analysis
Canadian securities regulators considered implementing key elements
of SOX, such as: (1) the establishment of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCOAB"), 60 (2) the registration
requirement of accounting firms which audit public companies, 61 (3) the
56. Christopher Nicholls, The Characteristics of Canada's Capital Markets and the Illustrative
Case of Canada's Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley 177 (June 2006),
http://www.tfmsl.ca/docsV4(3A)%2ONicholls.pdf.
57. See, e.g., Sukanya Pillay, Forcing Canada's Hand? The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on Canadian Corporate Governance Reform, 30 MAN. L.J. 285, 300 (2004); see also Nicholls,
supra note 56, at 177-78 ("Many Canadian regulators and legislators ... expressed concern about
the need for a Canadian response to SOX that would signal to capital market participants that
Canadian market regulation was just as strong and protective of investors' interests as American
regulation.").
58. CRA, supra note 11, at 8; Andrew J. Beck, Under Scrutiny: Governance in Canada,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fourth Quarter 2004, at 59.
59. Pillay, supra note 57, at 300.
60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750 (2002).
61. Id. § 102.
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subjection of these accounting firms to the standards set by PCOAB, 62
(4) the subjection of these accounting firms to periodic inspection by
PCOAB 6 3 and investigation of possible violations of SOX by these
accounting firms,64 (5) the requirement for an independent audit
committee, 65 (6) the requirements for the CEO and CFO to certify
financial statements, 66 and (7) the requirement for reporting of internal
controls. 67 The SOX requirements for internal control reporting were
particularly scrutinized by the OSC. 68 This final section was considered
particularly onerous because it required the reporting of the internal
control system, the certification of the system by management, and the
attestation by an external auditor that the management certification was
appropriate.
A cost-benefit analysis was prepared for the OSC by Charles River
Associates Canada ("CRA") to evaluate the appropriateness of
implementing similar measures in Canada and in particular the
requirement for reporting internal control section 404 of SOX.6 9 The
CRA paper estimated the costs and benefits of such implementation
through surveys of issuers and accountants. 70 These surveys revealed
that the expected primary drivers of costs in internal control reporting
are documenting procedures and initial testing.71  Most participants
estimated that the SOX requirement of an external auditor attestation of
the control systems accounted for forty to seventy percent of the cost of
compliance, primarily because of the cost of more thorough
documentation and testing.72 Benefits were identified as being internal
and external. The former include more efficient financial reporting
processes and improved management understanding of corporate
risks. 73 The latter refer to the capital market response to more accurate
financial reporting and decreased risk of misstatements, including
higher share values (decreased cost of capital), increased liquidity, and
increased competition of Canadian securities markets. 74  The
62. Id. § 103.
63. Id. § 104.
64. Id. § 105.
65. Id. § 301.
66. Id. § 302.
67. Id. § 404.
68. See generally CRA, supra note 11 (detailing the costs and benefits of SOX leglislation).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id. at 5, 9.
73. Id. at 23-24.
74. Id. at 28.
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measurable net effect of implementing internal control reporting was
expected to be negative for all firms, though CRA acknowledged that
there are gaps and inaccuracies in the quantification process,
particularly for the benefits.75  The CRA estimates indicated that
smaller issuers would be subjected to a greater proportion of both the
costs (economies of scale) and benefits of internal control reporting.
76
However, the net impact upon smaller firms was expected to be
significantly more negative than for larger firms. 77 The CRA canvassed
the possibilities for providing relief to small issuers from some or all of
the regulatory burden. These possibilities included an exemption from
the costly external auditor attestation requirement, complete exemption
for companies listing on the TSX Venture Exchange, or exemptions
based on issuer size.78 Neither the reporting of internal controls nor the
external auditor attestation requirement were included as part of the new
corporate governance regime in Canada.
B. Canadian Regulatory Response: The Instruments
The result of the Canadian debate and analysis was the
implementation of the Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act
in Ontario, 79 Multilateral Instrument 52-109 (CEO and CFO
Certifications), 80 Multilateral Instrument 52-110 (Audit Committees), 81
National Instrument 52-108 (Auditor Oversight), 82 National Instrument
58-101 (Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices), 83 and National
Instrument 58-201 (Corporate Governance Guidelines). 4 Initially,
every Canadian securities regulator agreed to these reforms except
British Columbia, which attempted to implement an approach that was
more consistent with a "principles-based" corporate governance
reform.85  The B.C. reforms were eventually shelved and British
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. Id. at 10-12, 48.
77. Id. at 48.
78. Id. at 53-54.
79. Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures), 2002, S.O. 2002, ch.
22-bill 198 (Can.).
80. Multilateral Instrument 52-109: Certification of Disclosures in Issuers' Annual and
Interim Filings, 27 O.S.C.B. 3,230 (2004) (Can.).
81. Multilateral Instrument 52-110: Audit Committees, 27 O.S.C.B. 3,252 (2004) (Can.)
82. National Instrument 52-108: Auditor Oversight, 27 O.S.C.B. 3,227 (2004) (Can.).
83. National Instrument 58-101: Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, 28 O.S.C.B.
5,377 (2005) (Can.).
84. National Policy 58-201: Corporate Governance Guidelines, 28 O.S.C.B. 5,383 (2005)
(Can.).
85. Pillay, supra note 57, at 309-10.
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Columbia has since adopted all of these instruments and policies except
Bill 198 (secondary market liability), MI 52-110, and portions of NI
52-108, which is also not applicable to Alberta and Manitoba.
Multilateral Instrument 52-111, the Canadian equivalent of section
404 of SOX, was not implemented although the requirement for
management certification of internal controls was inserted into MI 52-
109, which encapsulates the certification requirements of section 302 of
SOX. 86  Similarly, MI 52-110 substantively encapsulates the require-
ments for an independent audit committee as required in section 302 of
SOX, with the exception that each audit committee is not required to
have a "financial expert," although it does require that each member be
financially literate or become financially literate within a reasonable
period of time.
87
National Instrument 52-108 is similar to sections 101 to 105 of SOX
in requiring that only accounting firms that have registered with the
Canadian Public Accountancy Board ("CPAB") perform audits of
public companies. 88 However, there are some significant differences
between the function of CPAB and PCOAB due to the legislative
frameworks within which they operate. 89 Most notably, CPAB is not
subject to direct regulatory oversight, possibly due to the lack of a
federal regulator, and the scope of CPAB's mandate is not specifically
defined through legislation. CPAB creates its own mandate subject to
the authority of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
("CICA"), the Federal Superintendent of Financial Institutions and the
various provincial securities regulators who created CPAB through a
memorandum of understanding. 90 The authority for CPAB to govern
the registered firms is created through the statutorily mandated
contractual relationship between CPAB and the accounting firms, as
opposed to the direct statutory authority of SOX. 91
This contractual relationship means CPAB lacks the powers and
86. Multilateral Instrument 52-111: Reporting on Internal Control Financial Reporting, 28
OSCB 1302 (2005) (Can.); Multilateral Instrument 52-313: Canadian Securities Administrator
Notice, 29 OSCB 2011 (2006) (Can.).
87. Multilateral Instrument 52-110: Audit Committees, 27 O.S.C.B. 3,252 (2004) (Can.).
88. National Instrument 52-108: Auditor Oversight, 27 O.S.C.B. 3,227 (2004) (Can.).
89. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Corporate Gatekeeper Liability in Canada, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 441
(2007); Adam C. Pritchard & Poonam Pur, The Regulation of Public Auditing in Canada and the
United States: Self-Regulation or Government Regulation?, Fraser Institute Digital Publication,
Feb. 2006, http://www.fraserinsfitute.org/COMMERCE.WEB/product-fileslPublic%20Auditing2
.pdf.
90. Pritchard & Puri, supra note 89, at 16.
91. National Instrument 52-108: Auditor Oversight, 27 O.S.C.B. 3,227 (2004) (Can.).
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protections that are normally provided to government regulators,
including access to confidential information and protection for its
directors, officers, and staff.92 In contrast to the SOX model, CPAB
does not directly set standards for auditors. Instead, the provision of
accounting standards remains within the purview of the CICA.
93
Finally, inspection of accounting firms by CPAB is not statutorily
mandated, and CPAB has allowed the provincial accounting self-
regulatory bodies to inspect smaller firms subject to CPAB rules and
procedures.
94
The following chart provides a brief comparison of the Canadian and
American regulatory schemes:
United States Canada
Section 404 (Internal Controls) Multilateral Instrument 52-109
Reporting of internal controls (CEO and CFO certification)
and auditor attestation * Requirement for management
certification of internal controls
inserted into MI 52-109
* Does not include reporting of
internal controls or auditor
attestation
Section 302 Multilateral Instrument 52-110
* Requires CEO and CFO to (Audit Committees)
certify financial statements * Encapsulates certification
requirements of section 302
e Substantively encapsulates the
requirements for an independent
audit committee, although each
independent audit committee is
not required to have a "financial
expert"
Section 101 National Instrument 52-108
& Established the PCAOB (Auditor Oversight)
Section 105 * Requires audits of public
* Allows the investigation of companies to be performed by
possible violations of SOX by accounting firms who have
registered accounting firms registered with the CPAB
92. Pritchard & Puri, supra note 89, at 17.
93. Id. at 27.
94. Id. at 30.
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It is also important to note that National Instruments 58-101 and 58-
201 are not strict rules approximating the SOX approach. Instead, they
provide guidelines for appropriate corporate governance practices and
require disclosure of variations from these guidelines. 95 As such, the
Canadian approach has been described as an attempt to avoid strict rules
and instead allow "the capital markets, and hence ultimately the
investing shareholders, to be the judge of the effectiveness of a firm's
corporate governance policies."96 The principles-based approach may
be justified by the differences between the Canadian and U.S. capital
markets such as the greater number of "small-cap" firms for which the
cost of compliance may be proportionally higher, the greater number of
closely held firms, and the smaller number of suitable candidates for
independent board membership in Canada. 97 In addition, it has been
argued that "the principles-based approach is more effective in
establishing a culture of compliance with corporate governance
principles rather than simply compliance with bright-line tests found in
a rules-based system" and that "the principles-based approach imposes
the onus of implementing governance standards on the capital markets
and its participants, rather than on the legislators and regulators as under
the rules-based approach."'98 Similarly, it has been argued that "[w]e
cannot build investor confidence by adding rules that make regulation
more complex and burdensome but don't really improve investor
protection. Indeed, this approach could backfire if investors were to
relax their vigilance, assuming the new rules had made the markets
safer."
99
The new Canadian instruments should also be considered within the
context of shareholder protections in both Canadian corporate and
securities law. The securities law reforms outlined above increase the
checks on managerial discretion through enhanced requirements for
independent directors and increased exposure of managers to litigation
liability through certification requirements and the broadening of
liability for securities law breaches. However, recent corporate law
95. Id.
96. Erinn B. Broshko & Kai Li, Playing by the Rules: Comparing principles-based and rules-
based corporate governance in Canada and the U.S., CAN. INVESTMENT REV., winter 2006, at
18-19.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 23.
99. Douglas M. Hyndman, Chair, British Colom. Sec. Comm'n, Submission to the Standing
Senate Comm. on Banking Trade and Commerce, What Kind of Securities Regulation for
Canada? 5 (May 23, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/
Hyndman_2003-05-23.pdf) [hereinafter Hyndman].
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reforms, such as the required level of shareholdings to submit a
shareholder proposal, tilt the scale in the opposite direction. In
particular, under the recently revised Canada Business Corporations Act
("CBCA"), a shareholder's eligibility to submit a proposal is
determined by a combination of section 137(1.1) of the revised CBCA
and section 46 of the accompanying regulations. To be eligible to
submit a proposal, a shareholder must:
(1) be a registered holder or beneficial owner for at least the
prescribed period (i.e. six months immediately prior to the date of
submission); and
(2) own at least the prescribed number of outstanding shares of the
corporation (i.e., either one percent of the total outstanding voting
shares as of the date of submission, or shares with a fair market value
of at least two thousand dollars at the close of business on the day
before submission).100
It has been argued that this shift in oversight power to large investors
enhances their ability to influence corporate governance.' 0 ' Janis Sarra
cautions that utilizing the large players in capital markets to indirectly
regulate corporate conduct (as discussed above in relation to the
principles-based approach to corporate governance) implicitly assumes
their reactions are an appropriate proxy for all investors and that all
costs are effectively encapsulated in the current financial disclosure
requirements. 10 2  Arguably, these assumptions marginalize the small
investor who has different risk exposures relative to the larger investors.
IV. THE UPSIDE AND CHALLENGES OF THE CANADIAN RESPONSE
A. Calls to Roll Back SOX
The current focus on amending or rolling back SOX is centered upon
section 404, which deals with internal controls. Section 404 has
become "one of the most controversial and criticized sections of
100. Canada Business Corporations Act, 1985 R.S.C., c. C-44, § 137(1.1) (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/ca/sta/c-44/secl37.html; Canada Business Corporations Regulations,
SOR/2001-512, § 46 (Can.), available at http:/www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cd-dgc.nsf/en/
cs01376e.html#part6.
101. Some commentators have questioned the necessity of this threshold requirement and
have argued that it "will only serve to exclude small investors." Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the
Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social
and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 365, 386 (2006); see Janis Sarra, The
Corporation as Symphony: Are Shareholders First Violin or Second Fiddle? 36 U.B.C.L. REV.
403, 440-41 (2003) (explaining the benefit to large investors and danger to smaller investors).
102. Sarra, supra note 101, at 434, 441.
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[SOX]. '1 03 This section has two primary focuses: (1) the requirement
that corporate managers report, in a company's yearly and quarterly
filings, the state of the company's internal accounting controls, and (2)
the requirement that an independent outside auditor attest to the
effectiveness of such internal controls.
104
Many commentators have noted the high cost of compliance with
section 404105 and in particular its adverse impact on smaller public
companies. 10 6 Because some costs of compliance are fixed, smaller
companies may be more likely to experience negative effects than larger
companies. In other words, critics have argued that the requirements
overburden small companies because they must divert their resources to
ensuring compliance with the securities regulatory system to the
detriment of pursuing business initiatives. 10 7 As the president of the
Competitive Enterprise Institute stated, "[t]o deal with the problem of a
few big business bad apples, Congress created a web of costs and
mandates that are shackling innovation. These rules disproportionately
hurt the innovative entrepreneurs who run small public companies."' 10 8
A consequence of the higher costs facing smaller companies is that
greater numbers are either listing abroad or choosing to go private. 109
Other problems cited with section 404 include the lack of guidance
for management to determine whether internal control over financial
reporting is effective, the fact that the regulations are not scaled to take
into account the specific manner in which smaller companies operate,
and the rigid, prescriptive audits resulting from the application of
103. Timothy L. Weston, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Under Siege: Solutions for Solving the
Problems of Implementing Section 404, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 86, 86 (2006).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 88; Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate
Governance in the Post-Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65, 71 (2006); Peter Ferola,
Internal Controls in the Aftermath of Sarbanes-Oxley: One Size Doesn't Fit All, 48 S. TEx. L.
REV. 87, 113-18 (2006); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 255
(2005).
106. Ginger Carroll, Thinking Small: Adjusting Regulatory Burdens Incurred by Small Public
Companies Seeking to Comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 443, 452-53
(2006); Ferola, supra note 105, at 118-20; Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back
and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L.
REV. 1, 23 (2007); Neal L. Wolkoff, Sarbanes-Oxley Is a Curse for Small-Cap Companies, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 15, 2005, at A13.
107. Carroll, supra note 106, at 453 (citing Mallory Factor, Two Cheers for Nancy Pelosi,
WALL ST. J., March 18, 2006, at A9).
108. Weston, supra note 103, at 87 (quoting Stephen Taub, What's Next for Section 404?,
CFO.cOM, April 14, 2005, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3880361?f=homebreakingnews).
109. Ferola, supra note 105, at 115-16.
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Accounting Standard No. 2 (the standard developed by the PCAOB for
auditor attestation of management review of internal controls). 110 Some
have critiqued the regulatory watchdog PCAOB as altering auditor
behavior and diminishing professional judgment."' Trade groups and
securities law professors have complained that "boards and accountants
spend too much time meeting meaningless criteria rather than getting to
the root of more insidious problems." 1 2 A similar argument based on
the "crowding-out effects" of the regulation questions whether the
commitment of resources to section 404 implementations diverts
"management attention from higher-return activities."' 13
Several commentators have called for amendments to section 404,
including exempting small companies from the attestations
requirement.11 4 Others have called for reforms to tailor the regulations
to fit the needs of companies based on their various sizes. 115 In the past
two years, various committees have proposed regulatory changes to
SOX provisions, specifically to those pertaining to internal controls. A
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) advisory committee,
established to assess the regulatory system for smaller companies under
U.S. securities laws, concluded in its final report that the costs imposed
on smaller public corporations by a number of SOX provisions
significantly exceeded any benefit the provisions provided to
investors. 116 The committee recommended scaling back SOX for
smaller public corporations and exempting altogether certain smaller
classes of public companies from section 404.1 17 In a May 2006 press
release, the SEC responded by announcing that the Commission would
be seeking views on guidance for management "to ensure that the
guidance [of] the Commission ... addresses the needs and concerns of
110. ADIVSORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUB. Cos., FINAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMM'N 30-32 (2006), http:/www.sec.gov/info/smalibus/acspc/acspc-
finalreport.pdf at 30-32 [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM.].
111. Id. at32.
112. Carrie Johnson & Ben White, Opportunity for Corporate Fraud Has Shrunk-But It's
Still There, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2006, at Dl.
113. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 130 (2006),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/l 1.30CommitteeInterimReportsREV2.pdf [hereinafter COMM.
ON CAPITAL].
114. Branson, supra note 105, at 75 (citing Nathan Wilda, David Pays for Goliath's Mistakes:
The Costly Effect Sarbanes-Oxley Has on Small Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 692
(2005)); see also Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 106, at 22 (arguing for exemption of small
companies from the primary provisions of section 404, but not exempting them altogether).
115. Carroll, supra note 106, at 467.
116. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 110, at 135; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-
Oxley: Legislating in Haste, Repenting in Leisure, 2:1 CORP. Gov. L. REV. 69, 93 (2006).
117. See Ferola, supra note 105, at 118-19.
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all public companies."' 118 The SEC rejected the advisory committee's
recommendation to exempt smaller public companies as defined in its
report.
119
In September 2006, Harvard Law professor Hal S. Scott formed the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation. In general, this group of
business leaders and academics recommended a risk-based and
principles-based approach to capital markets regulation "rather than the
current regime of detailed prescriptive rules." 120  The committee
recommended no statutory changes to SOX, but rather suggested
reforms to the implementation of section 404-"a redefinition of
materiality, more guidance from the PCAOB, and multi-year rotational
testing permitted with an annual attestation." 121 If the costs of
compliance with section 404 are found to be too high for small
companies, the committee's report recommended that the SEC ask
Congress to exempt small companies from the auditor attestation
requirement while changing the manager certification requirement to a
standard of "reasonable belief in the adequacy of internal controls." 122
Similarly, Senator Charles Schumer and New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, in their January 2007 report, recommended clearer
guidance for implementing SOX, a risk-based audit of internal controls,
and permitting smaller companies to opt-out of the more onerous
provisions, provided that full disclosure to investors is met. 12
3
In response to the many criticisms of section 404, the SEC has
postponed the date by which smaller companies must comply to fiscal
years ending on or after December 15, 2007.124 It also extended the
deadline for the auditor attestation requirement for smaller companies,
which must comply with the requirement in their annual reports filed for
fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2008.125 In addition, in
December 2006, the SEC published for comment its proposed
interpretive guidance for management regarding the implementation of
118. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Announces Next Steps for Sarbanes-Oxley
Implementation (May 17, 2006), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-75.htm.
119. Id.
120. COMM. ON CAPITAL, supra note 113, at xii, 8.
121. Id. at xiii, 19-20.
122. Id. at 20.
123. BLOOMBERG & SCHUMER, supra note 1, at 19-20.
124. Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8760, 34-
54,942, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,580, 76,581 (Dec. 15, 2006); Jason Green, Sarbanes-Oxley Changes
Should Help Small Public Companies, 9 LAW. J. 6, 6 (2007).
125. See Green, supra note 124, at 6; see also Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 71
Fed. Reg. at 76,581 (discussing when a non-accelerated filer must file the auditor's attestation
report).
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internal control over financial reporting. 126 The guidance is intended to
allow companies to scale and tailor their evaluation procedures to fit
their particular circumstances. 127  "The proposed guidance focuses
companies on (a) controls necessary for the prevention or detection of
material misstatements in financial statements, and (b) performing their
evaluation with a risk-based approach."' 128  It will allow auditors to
employ a "material risk" standard: "The proposed guidance promotes
efficiency by allowing management to focus on those controls that are
needed to adequately address the risk of a material misstatement in its
financial statements. There is no requirement in [the] guidance to
identify every control in a process or document the business processes
impacting ICFR."' 129 At the same time, the PCAOB published, for
comment, its proposed new Auditing Standard 5, which superseded the
existing Auditing Standard 2 by simplifying and shortening the
standard. 130 The period for comments ended on February 26, 2007.131
The SEC argues that the proposed guideline will address the particular
needs and operations of smaller companies. "As smaller public
companies generally have less complex internal control systems than
larger public companies, this top-down, risk-based approach should
enable [them] in particular to scale and tailor their evaluation methods
and procedures to fit their own facts and circumstances." 132 Most
recently, on April 24, 2007, the U.S. Senate set aside an amendment to
SOX that would make compliance with section 404 optional for
companies with total market value of less than seven hundred million
dollars. 
133
126. Management's Report on Internal Control, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8762, 34-
54,976, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,635, 77,636 (Dec. 20, 2006).
127. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Propose Interpretive Guidance for
Management to Improve Sarbanes-Oxley 404 Implementation (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
www.sec.gov.news/press/2006/2006-206.htm.
128. CANADIAN SEC. ADMIN'S, NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS: PROPOSED REPEAL
AND REPLACEMENT OF MI 52-109 (2007), www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/
Part5/rule_20070330_52-109_cert-of-disc.pdf [hereinafter CANADIAN SEC. ADMIN'S]; see also
Management's Report on Internal Control, 71 Fed. Reg. at 77,639-40 (reviewing the proposed
guidelines' main principles).
129. Management's Report on Internal Control, 71 Fed. Reg. at 77,640.
130. CANADIAN SEC. ADMIN'S, supra note 128; see also Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
Proposed Auditing Standard (2006), http://www.pcaob.org/Rules/Docket_021/2006-12-
19_ReleaseNo..2006-007.pdf (proposing the new auditing standard).
131. CANADIAN SEC. ADMIN'S, supra note 128.
132. Management's Report on Internal Control, 71 Fed. Reg. at 77639-40.
133. Senate Rejects Sarbanes-Oxley Change, http://www.insidesarbanesoxley.com2007/04/
senate-rejects-sarbanes-oxley-change.asp (Apr. 29, 2007).
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B. Recent Canadian Proposals for Reform
In Canada, with the implementation of MI 52-109, each CEO and
CFO of an issuer company is required to file a separate annual
certificate stating that she has "reviewed the annual filings," has no
knowledge of any material misrepresentation, that the "annual filings
fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the issuer," and that she is "responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures and
internal control over financial reporting for the issuer .. .. *"134 While
these controls are defined, MI 52-109 does not provide a standard to
which the issuer must comply. In addition, there is no requirement to
disclose any details of the control framework chosen by management.
The companion policy to MI 52-109 indicates that this ambiguity was
deliberate to allow management to identify the appropriate standard for
the company "based on various factors that may be particular to an
issuer, including its size, the nature of its business and the complexity of
its operations."'
135
In response to the SEC's proposed guidance for internal control
reporting requirements, the Canadian Securities Administrators
("CSA") published for comment the proposed repeal and replacement of
MI 52-109 (released March 30, 2007). 136 In the notice and request for
comments, the CSA confirms its approach of not requiring an audit
opinion regarding management's assessment of the effectiveness of
internal controls:
We propose to require management to evaluate an issuer's ICFR
[internal control over financial reporting] and provide MD&A
disclosure about their conclusions about the effectiveness of ICFR
based on such evaluation. We do not propose requiring an issuer to
obtain from its auditor an internal control audit opinion concerning
management's assessment of the effectiveness of ICFR. We think our
proposal will balance the costs and benefits associated with internal
control reporting requirements, while increasing management's focus
on, and accountability for, the quality of ICFR.
1 37
Under the proposed changes, Part 1 of MI 52-109 would include a
definition of "reportable deficiency," which is a deficiency "in the
design or operation of one or more controls that would cause a
134. Multilateral Instrument 52-109: Certification of Disclosures in Issuers' Annual Interim
Filings, 27 O.S.C.B. 935, 939 (2004) (Can.).
135. Id. at 27 O.S.C.B. 944.
136. CANADIAN SEC. ADMIN'S, supra 128.
137. Id.
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reasonable person to doubt that the design operation of ICFR provides
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting or
the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in
accordance with the issuer's [] GAAP."' 138 A deficiency deemed a
reportable deficiency would have to be disclosed in an issuer's
MD&A. 13 9 Part 2 would require issuers to cause their certifying
officers to design or supervise the design of the disclosure controls and
procedures and internal control over financial reporting. 1
40
The existing ambiguity in MI 52-109 appears to leave managers
without any legal requirement to implement new control procedures.
However, the creation of personal liability for the CEO and CFO
through the certification process, in most cases, will motivate managers
to implement processes that can be reasonably justified. Although MI
52-111 was not implemented, it does provide some insight into the
standard anticipated by the securities regulatory authorities. The
companion policy for MI 52-111 identified three existing control
frameworks against which a manager could evaluate the effectiveness of
internal control processes:
(a) the Risk Management and Governance (formerly: Guidance of the
Criteria of Control Board) published by The Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants;
(b) the Internal Control-Integrated Framework published by The
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
[("COSO")]; and
(c) the Turnbull Report published by The Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales.
141
The second of these frameworks, COSO, was also recommended by
the SEC for use in conjunction with SOX requirements. 142 Thus,
prudent corporate managers who wish to minimize their potential
liability under the certification requirements of MI 52-109 would be
encouraged to implement COSO or similar control processes unless
they have a reasonable justification to do otherwise.
Without a requirement to disclose the form of an issuer's internal




141. Multilateral Instrument 52-111: Reporting on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting,
28 O.S.C.B. 1312-13 (2005) (Can.).
142. Michelle L. Kaarst-Brown & Shirley Kelly, IT Governance and Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Latest Sales Pitch or Real Challenges for the IT Function?, PROC. 38TH ANN. HAW. INT'L CONF.
Sys. So. 1, 8 (2005).
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respond to and influence issuers' control management decisions on an
ex-ante basis. However, the retention of the certification requirement
by the CEO and CFO creates potential civil liability for the key decision
makers of the corporation, thus allowing for private enforcement ex-
post. The Canadian approach appears to utilize private enforcement
mechanisms to influence decisionmakers into implementing stringent
corporate governance regimes, including internal control systems. This
approach provides Canadian firms with flexibility to accommodate
individual issues, such as the complexity and size of the business. It is
also arguably more in line with the Canadian "principles-based"
corporate governance model. Issuers will not be able to merely comply
with specific rules and regulations while ignoring the fundamental
principles of maintaining effective control systems to provide accurate
and fair reports of a corporation's financial well being. However,
without any ex-ante enforcement mechanisms in place, it is arguable
that the Canadian regulatory regime does less to mitigate the risk of
financial misrepresentations. It has yet to be determined if this model of
corporate governance regulation will provide greater net benefits to the
capital markets.
V. CONCLUSION
The Canadian response to SOX outlined in this article has been
described as an attempt to avoid strict rules and instead allow "the
capital markets, and hence ultimately the investing shareholders, to be
the judge of the effectiveness of a firm's corporate governance
policies." 143 The current calls to roll back SOX and the proposed
reforms suggest that the United States may be moving in the Canadian
direction, but with different justifications. In Canada, the principles-
based approach may be justified through the differences between the
Canadian and U.S. capital markets such as the greater number of
"small-cap" firms for which the cost of compliance may be
proportionally higher, the greater number of closely held firms, and the
smaller number of suitable candidates for independent board
membership in Canada. 144 A rationale for the Canadian approach that
is also applicable in the U.S. is that "the principles-based approach is
more effective in establishing a culture of compliance with corporate
governance principles rather than simply compliance with bright-line
tests" and that "the principles-based approach imposes the onus of
implementing governance standards on the capital markets and its
143. Broshko & Li, supra note 96, at 19.
144. Id.
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participants, rather than on the legislators and regulators .... 145
Similarly, it has been argued that "[wle cannot build investor
confidence by adding rules that make regulation more complex and
burdensome but don't really improve investor protection. Indeed, this
approach could backfire if investors were to relax their vigilance,
assuming the new rules had made the markets safer."
146
This Article does not suggest that the Canadian model is without its
own challenges. The new Canadian instruments need to be considered
within the context of shareholder protections in both Canadian corporate
and securities law. While the securities law reforms outlined in this
Article increase the checks on managerial discretion, recent corporate
law reforms shift oversight power "to large investors and their ability to
influence corporate governance."' 147 The key challenge facing Canadian
regulators is how to address the impact of utilizing the large players in
capital markets to indirectly regulate corporate conduct. This approach
implicitly assumes their reactions are an appropriate proxy for all
investors and that all costs are effectively encapsulated in the current
financial disclosure requirements. 148  Arguably, these assumptions
marginalize the small investor who has different risk exposures relative
to the larger investor.
145. Id. at 23.
146. Hyndman, supra note 99, at 5.
147. Sarra, supra note 101, at 440.
148. Id. at 434, 440-41.
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